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1Introduction: FDA Regulation of Legalized Narcotics1
Drug legalization2 entails the free-market availability of all currently illegal drugs; in such a regime, “the en-
tire illicit drug trade would become legal: manufacture, transportation, sale, purchase, possession, use.”3 All
currently illegal drugs would become as available to consumers as any other prescription or non-prescription
drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).4 The FDA seems the natural regulator of newly-
legalized drugs (NLD’s) because the FDA already regulates “almost every object placed into or around the
human body.” 5 While many advocates of legalizing drugs suggest that the FDA should regulate NLD’s,
very little has been written about how the FDA would regulate once illicit drugs like legal drugs.6 For
instance, California Superior Court Justice James Gray, a proponent of drug legalization, envisions a drug
legalization regime
in which a person goes to his local supermarket for groceries. He puts into
his cart some frozen lemonade, chocolate chip cookies, aspirin grapes—and
a six-pack of cocaine. A friend has recommended the “Big Kick” brand
of cocaine and the store is having a special sale: six hits for the price of
four. In this scenario, all of the products in this man’s cart are sold in a
“legalized” or “free” market.
Under such a program, the FDA would ensure the cleanliness and purity of
all these products, and see to it that they were labeled accurately for their
contents and strength. This is how the FDA regulates the sale of aspirin,
a fully “legalized” drug in this country.7
This paper oﬀers a brief model of FDA regulation of currently illegal narcotics in the United States. Given
1The author does not in any way advocate the legalization of illegal narcotics. Rather, this is a practical application of
the FDCA and FDA case law to what would be an interesting agency challenge.
2As distinguished from drug decriminalization. In contrast, drug decriminalization entails purposeful non-enforcement of
drug laws. Drug decriminalization is best exempliﬁed by the Netherlands. “The juridical formulation is, of course, much more
complicated, but practically speaking the use of cannabis products has been legalized; every town has at least one ‘hash and
coﬀee shop,’ and the possession of less than 30 grams is not prosecuted by the police. In spite of this liberalization of use of
soft drugs, traﬃcking in cannabis products is still forbidden.” Otto Janssen, Normalization of the Drugs Problem: An Outline
of the Dutch Drugs Policy, in De-Americanizing Drug Policy 127 (ed., Lorenz B¨ ollinger, 1994) [hereinafter B¨ ollinger].
3Richard Lawrence Miller, The Case for Legalizing Drugs 138 (1991) [hereinafter Miller].
4Id.
5Roesann B. Termini, The Legal Authority of the United States Food and Drug Administration to Regulate Tobacco: Calling
on Congress, 74 St. John’s L. Rev. 63 (2000), citing 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,619 and 44,628 (1996) [hereinafter Termini].
6This paper does not consider the possible regulation of NLD’s by the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco (BATF) or
BATF involvement in the hypothetical legalized drug regime.
2that nearly three out of four Americans believe that the drug war has failed,8 recent calls from prominent
liberal and conservative thinkers to legalize drugs, and state “compassionate use” ballot initiatives, future
drug legalization is at least conceivable in the United States.
Yet, how would the FDA regulate NLD’s under its current statutory mandate and agency discretion. To
answer this question, this paper applies current FDA regulation procedures, derived from the Food, Drugs,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)9 to the regulation of NLD’s.10
Part One of this paper considers the trend toward drug legalization in the United States: the apparent failure
of the drug war, calls for legalization from prominent Americans, state medical marijuana referenda, and the
historical analogies cited by proponents of drug legalization to America’s failed alcohol prohibition regime
(1920-33). Secondly, it describes a hypothetical drug legalization regime, using the marketing of recreational
and medicinal marijuana as hypothetical NLD’s. Thirdly, it considers the threshold question of whether the
FDA indeed has statutory authority to regulate NLD’s without statutory amendment to the FDCA.
Part Two of this paper describes the FDA premarket approval process of the regulatory drug legalization
model in detail. First, it considers how the FDA would regulate the introduction of NLD’s into the market
by private manufacturers. Secondly, it considers whether the FDA should consider NLD’s new drugs or old
under the current new drug application (NDA) process.
Part One: The Trend Toward Drug Legalization
Introduction: The Failure of American Drug Prohibition
Americans have been spending more money on drugs; the government has been spending more money to ﬁght
drugs and incarcerating more drug oﬀenders. In 2000, roughly 14 million Americans were illicit drug users
according to a National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) study.11 In 1999, Americans spent $63.2
8According to a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press. See Walter Shapiro, Nation waits for
insanity to stop in the drug war, USA Today, Mar. 23, 2001, at A13.
921 U.S.C. §301 (2001)
10The only model NLD considered in this paper is marijuana.
11See National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, Oﬃce of Applied Studies, U.S., Department of Health and Human
3billion on illicit drugs.12 The United States government spends a total of forty billion dollars per year in the
war on drugs.13 The number of incarcerated men and women, mostly persons of color, in state and federal
prisons has quadrupled in recent years because of America’s tough drug laws.14 According to Judge James
Gray, excessive American drug consumption and excessive government funding of the war on drugs are part
of a historical trend. “The common theme throughout this country’s history of Drug Prohibition is that the
federal government has been increasingly active, but both federal and state governments have continually
passed tougher and tougher laws. With each upping of the ante, however, the situation has become worse.”15
One result of the America’s tough drug law enforcement is the rise of the so-called prison-industrial complex
and the human costs felt by the American inner-cities—e.g., skyrocketing incarceration rates, unemployment,
and poverty.16 Convicts jailed during the 1980s and 1990s for drug crimes “now account for more than 30%
of all inmates.”17 The drug war has had a disproportionate impact on blacks on Latinos. One commentator
has even found the disparity in drug sentencing “reminiscent of the Black Codes and Jim Crow laws—
ethnic discrimination against blacks by legal enforcement to contain and control. The sentencing disparity
is an obvious disregard for equal protection under the law.”18 For this reason, many proponents of drug
legalization claim that the drug war has devastated the inner city and minority communities. “Competing
American gangs intimidate and assault, and sometimes murder, anyone who opposes them as they ﬁght over
the large illicit proﬁts from drugs. This has helped devastate many inner-city neighborhoods because poor
Services (2000), at <http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/nhsda/2knhsda/chapter2.htm> (March 12, 2002).
12Oﬃce of National Drug Control Policy, 1999, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-1999; cited in National
Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report, at 114.
13Gary S. Becker, It’s Time to Give Up the War on Drugs, Business Week, Sept. 17, 2001, at 32.
14See Gray, supra note 7, at 29.
15See Gray, supra note 7, at 16.
16I.e., the massive increase in federal and state prison spending to accommodate prisoners convicted of drug-related crimes.
“The war provides a place for both semiskilled and skilled workers. Many of those who once held professional positions
and semiskilled jobs in manufacturing now ﬁnd themselves building and operating the infrastructure of the prison-industrial
complex.... Many states and localities depend on prison construction and operation as an integral part of their economies.” Kevin
Alexander Gray, A Call for an Anti-War Movement in How to Legalize Drugs 169 (Jeﬀerson Fish ed. 1998) [hereinafter
Fish].
17Gary S. Becker, It’s Time to Give Up the War on Drugs, Business Week, Sept. 17, 2001, at 32.
18See Fish, supra 16 note, at 166.
4blacks and Hispanics in these neighborhoods are the main foot soldiers in drug supply networks. They earn
what may appear to be pathetically little, given the risks they take, but their earnings often are higher than
what they could get in legal jobs.”19
Calls for Legalization from Prominent Americans
As a result of the failures of the American war on drugs, some prominent intellectuals, policymakers, and
lawyers, from both sides of the political spectrum, have called for legalization.20 Milton Friedman epitomizes
calls for drug legalization from prominent American intellectuals:
19Gary S. Becker, It’s Time to Give Up the War on Drugs, Business Week, Sept. 17, 2001, at 32.
20Corcoran, David, Legalizing Drugs: Failures Spur Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, at A15.
5Twenty-ﬁve years ago, President Richard M. Nixon an-
nounced a “War on Drugs.” I criticized the action on both moral and
expediential grounds in my Newsweek column of May 1, 1972, “Prohibition
and Drugs”: “On ethical grounds, do we have the right to use the ma-
chinery of government to prevent an individual from becoming an alcoholic
or a drug addict? For children, almost everyone would answer at least a
qualiﬁed yes. But for responsible adults, I, for one, would answer no.....
That basic ethical ﬂaw has inevitably generated speciﬁc evils during the
past quarter century, just as it did during our earlier attempt at alcohol
prohibition.
....
As I wrote in 1972: “... addicts and pushers are not the only ones cor-
rupted. Immense sums are at stake. It is inevitable that some relatively
low-paid police and other government oﬃcials—and some high-paid ones
as well—will succumb to the temptation to pick up easy money.”
2. Filling the prisons. In 1970, 200,000 people were in prison. Today, 1.6
million people are. Eight times as many in absolute number, six times as
many relative to the increased population. In addition, 2.3 million are on
probation and parole. The attempt to prohibit drugs is by far the major
source of the horrendous growth in the prison population.
There is no light at the end of that tunnel. How many of our citizens do
we want to turn into criminals before we yell “enough”?
3. Disproportionate imprisonment of blacks....
....
5. Compounding the harm to users. Prohibition makes drugs exorbitantly
expensive and highly uncertain in quality. A user must associate with crim-
inals to get the drugs, and many are driven to become criminals themselves
to ﬁnance the habit. Needles, which are hard to get, are often shared, with
the predictable eﬀect of spreading disease....
....
Can any policy, however high-minded, be moral if it leads to widespread
corruption, imprisons so many, has so racist an eﬀect, destroys our inner
cities, wreaks havoc on misguided and vulnerable individuals and brings
death and destruction to foreign countries?21
Like Friedman, other journalists, lawyers, and policymakers, and intellectuals, both liberal and conservative,
have questioned the eﬃcacy of America’s war on drugs. Other proponents of drug legalization include conser-
vatives like William F. Buckley, economist Thomas Sowell, and former Secretary of State George P. Schultz,
and liberals like former Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke, Phil Donahue, George Carlin, Alan Dershowitz,
Michael Kinsley, David Letterman, Andy Rooney, Carl Sagan, and Garry Trudeau.22 All have advocated
22See Gray, supra note 7, at 4; Kirby R. Cundiﬀ, Crime and the Drug War, Schaﬀer Library on Drug Policy, at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaﬀer/DEBATE/cundiﬀ1.htm.
6some form of drug legalization as the perhaps the last solution to America’s failed drug war.23 Even former
drug czar Barry R. McCaﬀrey, an opponent of drug legalization, has argued for some changes to the current
drug war strategy.24 McCaﬀrey noted that the solution to drug abuse is “to engage in a more coherent,
rational way [to treat] the chronically addicted as we encounter them in our communities.”25
Proponents of some form of drug legalization cite many justiﬁcations: eﬃcacy, wasted federal dollars, rising
incarceration rates (the prison industrial complex) and the disproportionate incarceration on minority com-
munities, the legality of tobacco and alcohol,26 libertarian ideals, etc. Other proponents argue that drug
legalization is simply a more eﬃcient and practical solution to the drug problem. For instance, a Rand study
found that current drug policy is much less cost-eﬀective than other non-enforcement methods.27
While there has been little traditional public support for drug legalization,28 proponents argue that some
sort of drug legalization is inevitable given the history of American prohibition, public frustration with the
war on drugs, and recent state initiatives for compassionate use of marijuana for terminally ill patients.29
State Referenda: Medical Marijuana
The rising number of states enacting medical marijuana referenda may also signal gradually increasing pop-
ularity for some form of drug legalization.30 Currently, eight states have approved ballot initiatives that
23E.g., property crime. Pointedly, there is also a strong chorus of economists, policy makers and specialists arguing that
legalization is not the solution to America’s drug problem. For an excellent critique of the drug legalization movement, see
James Q. Wilson, Legalizing Drugs Makes Matters Worse, Slate, Sept. 2, 2000, § Q.
24Christopher S. Wren, A Drug Warrior who Would Rather Treat than Fight, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2001, at A12.
25Id.
26“The focus here is not how dangerous drugs are or how much damage drug users inﬂict upon themselves. If these factors
were decisive, then surely alcohol and tobacco would be banned.... Rather, the proper focus is how eﬀective drug laws are
in preventing damage from drugs, compared with the amount of injury the laws themselves cause.” James Ostrowski, CATO
Policy Analysis, No. 121, May 25, 1989, at 7.
27“A Rand Study found that drug treatment is seven times more cost-eﬀective than domestic law enforcement in addressing
drug abuse, eleven times more cost-eﬀective than our attempt to interdict illicit drugs as they come across our borders, three
times more cost eﬀective than our drug eradication oversees.” Gray, supra note 7, at 181.
28See e.g., “Poll ﬁnds 90% Favor Keeping Drugs Illicit,” N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1988, at A26.
29See e.g., David G. Evans, High Court Was Right to Nix Medicinal Pot, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), May 22, 2001,
at L15.
30But see, Richard M. Evans, What is “Legalization”? What Are “Drugs”?, Gray, supra note 16, at 370 (noting that “These
measures and initiatives, worthy though they may be for medical and industrial purposes, bear no connection to legalization.
7legalize medical marijuana.31 This movement began in 1996 with two medical marijuana initiatives in Cali-
fornia and Arizona.32 In 1996, California voters approved a state ballot initiative called the “Compassionate
Use Act.”33 This act decriminalized the use of medical marijuana by terminally ill patients who received
a recommendations from a physician.34 The act also immunized physicians from state prosecution for rec-
ommending the drug for medical purposes.35 As a result of the of the successful California36 and Arizona37
medical marijuana referenda in 1996, the White Oﬃce of National Drug Control Policy established a two-year
study on the safety of medical marijuana. The authors, 11 independent experts at the Institute of Medicine,
found that “marijuana smoke was even more toxic than tobacco smoke and could cause cancer, lung damage
and pregnancy complications” and recommended use only by the terminally ill.38
American Alcohol Prohibition: A Harbinger of Failed Drug Prohibition Policy?
One of the most powerful arguments oﬀered for ending drug prohibition are the similarity of problems caused
Exempting small categories of people form the prohibition laws (e.g., chemotherapy patients, licensed hemp farmers) has little
to do with repealing prohibition entirely and allowing access to most adults.
31See Erik R. Neusch, “Medical Marijuana’s Fate in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s New Commerce Clause Jurispru-
dence,” 72 UCOLR 201 (2001), n.1 [hereinafter Neusch]. These states include, California (Cal. Health & Safety Code §
113625.(3) (West Supp. 2000); Colorado, see Colo. Const. amend. XX; Nevada, see NV. Const. Art. 4., § 38; Alaska, codiﬁed
at Alaska Stat. §§ 17.37.010-.080 & 11.71.090 (Michie 1999); Arizona, codiﬁed at Ariz. Rev. State. § 13-3412.01 (1999); Maine,
codiﬁed at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 22, § 2383-B (West 1999); Oregon, codiﬁed at Or. Rev. State. §§ 475.300-.375(1999);
and Washington state, codiﬁed at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.51A.005-.902 (1999). See generally id. “In fact, a number of states
decriminalized the possession of marijuana for certain cases long before the California and Arizona initiatives. Louisiana has
passed such a measure three times since 1981, and Virginia has had a similar one on the books since 1979. More recently, 1994
saw Ohio give medical marijuana a thumbs up...”. See CNN, “Weed Wars–State marijuana initiatives open,” (visited Feb. 23,
2002) <http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9702/weed.wars/issues/focus/index.html>. ¶13.
32Speciﬁcally, advocates note that “smoking marijuana has shown particular eﬀectiveness in treating the AIDS wasting
syndrome and the nausea and vomiting associated with chemotherapy. Neusch, supra note , “Medical Marijuana’s Fate in the
Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,” 72 UCOLR 201(2001).
33See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(e) (West Supp. 2000). “Arizona voters approved a similar initiative in the 1996
election only to have the legislature eﬀectively repeal it; however, in 1998, Arizona voters once again authorized the medical
use of marijuana,” see Neusch supra note 31 (citing Steve Yozwiak, Voters Reinstate Marijuana Law, Ariz. Repub., Nov. 4,
1998, at A1.)
34See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(e) (West Supp. 2000).
35Id.
36Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1136.25(3)(West Supp. 2000).
37Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3412.01 (1999).
38Christopher S. Wren, “Smoke and Heat,” N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1999, at A10 (paraphrasing McCaﬀery as stating that
“most nonviolent addicts behind bars belong in treatment centers not in prison where they learn to become better criminals”).
8by the drug war and those caused by American Prohibition (1920-1933). One commentator notes, “The new
public debate about drug laws has increased interest in the eﬀects of prohibition on public health, the
economy, and social problems.”39 For instance, drug proponents have noted that, as with drug prohibition,
alcohol prohibition “was massively and openly violated, and alcohol was readily available in most of the
United States.” Program oﬃcer for the Drug Policy Alliance, Robert Sharpe, oﬀers another oft-repeated
parallel between liquor and drug prohibition when he notes that alcohol prohibition “ﬁnanced organized crime
and violence, while failing miserably at preventing use.”40 Judge Gray notes that during the Prohibition
period, “federal funding for law enforcement eﬀorts was increased from $2.2 million in 1920 to $12 million
in 1929, and the federal prison population increased between 1920 and 1932 from 3,000 to 12,000, with
two-thirds the inmates incarcerated from alcohol and other drug oﬀenses.”41
Hypothetical Drug Legalization Regime for a Brief FDA Regulatory Model
Proponents of drug legalization cite a number of competing theoretical drug legalization models—some in
which the government markets and provides legalized drugs and others entailing a free market approach to
legalization.42 Consequently, it is important to state certain assumptions about this brief FDA regulatory
model. First, it should be assumed that private drug companies, not the government, will manufacture and
market the NLD’s to the public, no diﬀerently than drug companies now manufacturer and market over-the-
counter and prescription drugs. This is the free-market approach championed by famous drug legalization
proponent and libertarian Dr. Thomas Szaz.43 As mentioned earlier, other proponents of drug legalization
argue that the government should itself produce the drugs and oﬀer them to drug addicts.44 However, the
39See Harry G. Levine and Craig Reinarman, De-Americanizing Drug Policy: The Search for Alternatives for Failed Repres-
sion, 21 Peter Lang (1994).
40To the Editor, Robert Sharpe, “Harm Reduction as Alternative,” N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2001, at F3.
41See Gray supra note 7, at 23.
42“Over the past two decades a wide variety of plans have been put forward in the name of legalization. Most seem to fall into
one of three general categories: decriminalization plans, limitation plans, and regulation and taxation plans. Falling outside this
grouping are calls for outright legalization in which drugs would be produced, bought and sold like any ordinary commodity.”
Richard M. Evans, What is “Legalization”? What Are “Drugs”?, supra note 370 (1998).
43Richard M. Evans, What is “Legalization”? What Are “Drugs”?, in How to Legalize Drugs 370 (1998).
44See Gray, supra note 7 at 222 (“One possibility would be to allow the purchase of heroine, cocaine and marijuana by adults
9free market approach is commensurate with the purposes of drug legalization:
If drugs are to be treated under the law like tomatoes, magazines, medicines,
or toothpaste, it is hardly necessary to conjure a new set of rules about where
and to whom they can be sold, or to what extent they may become ingredients
in other products, or how they are to be taxed, and if their potency is to
latch on to the existing commodity that best illustrates the favored approach.
Free market proponents can bring clarity and spirit to the debate over how to
legalize drugs....
Thus, this model presumes that there is free-market availability of currently illegal drugs. As noted above,
the free-market approach decreases problems associated with the current drug war: excessive availability
lessens the possibility of black markets, drug—related crime, etc. For this reason, it should also be assumed
that NLD’s would be sold as over the counter drugs in this hypothetical regime.45 Because the purpose of
drug legalization, here, is to avoid the negative consequences of prohibition drugs should be available with
few restrictions. As one commentator notes, “Because so many problems associated with illicit drugs are due
to legal restrictions, we must be generous about access. For example, requiring prescriptions would merely
generate income for Dr. Feel Goods and prescription pad printers. If [currently illegal drugs] are legalized
they must be available over the counter.”46
Thirdly, we should assume that the FDA Commissioner will be diligent, but non-resistant to the ongoing
drug legalization regime. The FDA commissioner will not be a “maverick,” nor a reformer (e.g., former FDA
Commissioner David Kessler).47 In other words, we assume that the FDA Commissioner would follow general
FDA policy (issuing regulations, court enforcement)48 to ensure the safety of drugs by avoiding misbranding
and adulteration, but would not frustrate the marketing and distribution NLD’s. Put diﬀerently, the FDA
at state-licensed package stores. Dosage unites of drugs that are not sold not the streets for about $10 would be sold for about
$2.50 at these package store, which would eliminate the proﬁtability of illegal sales at one simple stroke.”).
45Thus, the FDA would most likely consider marijuana a new drug. See 21 U.S.C.A § 321(p)(1)(2001). See Part Two.
46Miller, supra note 3, at 138.
47Kessler was considered a maverick or reformist FDA commissioner. See e.g., Editorial, Preserve David Kessler’s Legacy,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1996, at A24; Jeﬀrey Goldberg, Big Tobacco’s Endgame, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1998, at §6, 36.
48Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, 1236 (Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill eds., Foundation Press 2d
ed. 1996)[hereinafter Hutt & Merrill].
10Commissioner’s stance on NLD’s would probably be similar to her stance on regulating cigarettes. Here, FDA
would play the role that one commentator describes when discussing the recent tobacco industry settlements
with states attorneys general:
Recent pressure on the tobacco industry appears to be giv-
ing rise to a new form of legalization that may come to be
called the “new cigarette model.” The “landmark settle-
ment” reached in June 1997 between the tobacco industry,
state attorneys general, and plaintiﬀs provides for the elim-
ination of advertising and marketing designed for underage
smokers; stronger warning labels on cigarettes [sic] packs; full
disclosure of ingredients; prohibition of tobacco use in public
places, work places and fast-food restaurants; and regulation
as well by the Food and Drug Administration. Notably, there
is no talk of prohibition. If these restrictions are codiﬁed, and
the new cigarette scheme is successful in curbing smoking by
the young, reducing threat to the public health, and reim-
bursing government its costs is entirely possible that the new
cigarette model could provide a legalization protocol at least
for marijuana, if not for other drugs as well.49
Finally, for the sake of simplicity, the only particular drug considered in detail in this model will be marijuana
for marketing by a private drug companies as both a recreational drug and, separately, as a medical drug
used to treat chemotherapy side eﬀects and AIDS wasting syndrome..
The FDA’s Jurisdiction over Newly Legalized Drugs without Amendment to FDCA
Without statutory amendment to the FDCA, it is unclear whether the FDA has authority to regulate
NLD’s. Before passage of the Controlled Substances Act,50 the FDA had responsibility for enforcing the
Drug Abuse Control Statute “to prevent the abuse of depressant and stimulant drugs... which also have a
legitimate use.”51 And, before 1970, “Federal control of narcotic drugs, marijuana and other drugs used for
recreational and nonmedical purposes was shared among several agencies and rested on a haphazard cluster
of laws enacted since 1900.”52 The FDA’s ability to assert jurisdiction over NLD’s would best be drawn
50See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A § 801 (2002)
51Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 535.
52Id.
11from the FDA’s historical attempts to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products in 1996.53 There appears to
be little history of the FDA directly regulating narcotics because, according to Judge James Gray,
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 led directly to the demise of the
patent medicine industry, not by prohibiting these substances, but simply
by requiring that all medications contain accurate labeling of their contents.
Subsequent amendments to the act required the labels to contain accurate
information about the strength of the drugs and to state that federal purity
standards had been met. This act, combined with various governmental ed-
ucational eﬀorts encouraging people not to use any medications containing
narcotics, resulted in a prompt, substantial, and permanent decline in the
sales of these products.54
Further, the Harrison Act and Webb v. United States,55 which together made it impossible for doctors to
legally give out prescription drugs for addicts suﬀering narcotics withdrawal. According to Judge Gray, this
decision “inaugurated the Drug Prohibition era in which we still live. As a result, people, including those
who were already accidentally addicted to these drugs, were forced to turn to the criminal black market in
order to obtain these substances.”56 Because the FDA has never regulated illegal drugs, it is important to
determine, what, if any jurisdiction the FDA would have over NLD’s without an amendment to the FDCA.
Current FDA Jurisdiction over Tobacco Products as an Indicator of FDA’s Jurisdiction over
NLD’s.
The best indicator of the FDA’s authority to regulate NLD’s, without amendment to the FDCA, is the
FDA’s current authority to regulate tobacco products: if the FDA has authority to regulate cigarettes, it
could be argued that the FDA should have authority regulate NLD’s. However, the Supreme Court recently
53Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distributions of Cigarettes & Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents;
Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,399(1996).
55Gray, supra note 7, at 22; See 249 U.S. 96 (1919)(holding that it was constitutional to prohibit retail sales of morphine by
a druggist without a physician’s prescription.)
56Gray, supra note 7, at 22.
12held in FDA v. Brown & Williamson57 that the FDA does not have authority to regulate cigarettes.58 Al-
though the Supreme Court has settled this jurisdictional issue, there are several good arguments oﬀered by
proponents of FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products the FDA could use to argue for authority to regulate
NLD’s in a legalized drug regime.
Arguments Against FDA Jurisdiction: Supreme Court Holding in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
The Supreme Court enunciated the strongest arguments against the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco
products in FDA v. Brown & Williamson: (1) the FDCA jurisdiction does not speciﬁcally include smok-
ing products; (2) the legislative failure of proposed amendments extending FDCA jurisdiction to smoking
products; and (3) Congress’ enactment of separate “tobacco-speciﬁc” legislation.59 In 1996, the FDA issued
a ﬁnal rule in which it determined that nicotine was a drug and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are
“drug-delivery devices.”60 A group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers and advertisers ﬁled suit in the Mid-
dle District of North Carolina against the FDA.61
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Court aﬃrmed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and found held
that Congress had not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. The Court stated that
the purpose of the FDCA, read as a whole, was to ensure all products regulated by the FDA were “safe” and
eﬀective for intended use.62 Justice O’Connor noted that this “essential purpose pervades the FDCA.”63
The Court buttressed this conclusion with the pervading safety and eﬀectiveness purpose of the FDCA:
57FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. et. al., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
58Id. (aﬃrming the decision of the Fourth Circuit that Congress had not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products).
59Rodney A. Morris, Sssmokinnn’: the Supreme Court Burns the FDA’s Authority to Regulate Tobacco in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 34 CRLR 1111, 1122 (June 2001).
60“Regulations Restricting The Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adoles-
cents.” 61 Fed. Reg. 44,418 (1996). “The agency also determined that the only way to reduce the amount of tobacco-related
illness and mortality was to reduce the level of addiction, a goal that could be accomplished only by preventing children and
adolescents from starting to use tobacco,” the FDA then promulgated regulations concerning that advertising, promotion,
labeling of tobacco products, etc. 120 S.Ct. 1291, 1298.
61See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997), rev’d sub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
et. al. v. FDA, 153 F.3d (4th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 161 F.3d (4th Cir. 1998), and cert. granted, FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 1086 (1999), and aﬀ’d ,120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000).
62Id. at 1301.
63Id.
13the FDA’s premarket approval process for new drugs, classiﬁcation of devices, ability to withdraw approval,
etc.64
The Court found there was insuﬃcient evidence of congressional intent to permit the FDA to regulate tobacco
products. First, the court noted that Congress had never passed an initiative granting the FDA authority to
regulate tobacco products. Justice O’Connor noted that Congress “explicitly considered granting the FDA
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products” under several initiatives, none of which passed.65 Second, the
Court found Congress’ enactment of separate “tobacco-speciﬁc” legislation of tobacco products additional
evidence of its intent not to confer cigarette regulation authority on the FDA.66 The Court noted: “Congress
has enacted six separate pieces of legislation since 1965 addressing the problem of tobacco use and human
health.”67 The Court also noted, in dicta, that the FDA agency history demonstrated a policy of not assert-
ing authority to regulate cigarettes.68 As Justice O’Connor noted, the FDA asserted its authority in 1996
after “having expressly disavowed any such authority since its inception.”69
Potential Arguments for FDA Jurisdiction over Cigarettes: the FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Dissent and Middle District Court Holding
The best arguments for FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction over cigarettes, and by extension, NLD’s, are found
in the FDA v. Brown & Williamson dissent and the holding of the lower North Carolina Middle District





68E.g., Justice O’Connor noted: “Congress has acted against the backdrop of the FDA’s consistent and repeated statements
that it lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco....” Id. at 1306.
69Id. at 125. But see United States v. 46 Cartons, More or Less, Containing Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J.
1953); United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959).
14& Williamson70 made two salient arguments in favor of FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco products: (1)
tobacco products meet the statutory deﬁnition of “articles other than food intended to aﬀect the structure
or any function of the body”71 and (2) taken as a whole, the FDCA gives the FDA authority to regulate
cigarettes.
The dissent noted that cigarettes also met the statutory deﬁnition of the Pure Food and Drug Act, which
is “medicines and preparations recognized by the United States Pharmacopoeia... and any substance or
mixture of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease.”72 The dissent
cited the evidence of experts who believed that the statute contained purposefully broad statutory language.
Secondly, the dissent found that taken as a whole, the FDCA gave the FDA authority to regulate cigarettes.
Justice Breyer noted that “the statute’s basic purpose – the protection of public health – supports the
inclusion of cigarettes within its scope. Thirdly, the dissent did not ﬁnd the FDA’s historical reluctance to
assert jurisdiction over tobacco products to undercut its subsequent assertion of jurisdiction in 1996. Justice
Breyer stated: “Nor is it surprising that such a statutory delegation of power could lead after many years to
an assertion of jurisdiction that the 1938 legislators might not have expected. Such a possibility is inherent
in the very nature of a broad delegation.”
The holding of the lower Middle District of North Carolina in Coyne reversed by the Fourth District Court
and Supreme Court, found that the FDA had regulatory power over tobacco products.73 The plaintiﬀs
claimed that Congress “has clearly withheld from the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products” because
“neither the text of the FDCA nor its direct legislative history addresses tobacco products.”74 Applying a
Chevron analysis to the FDCA, the Middle District court found that Congress had not directly spoken to
70120 S. Ct. 1291.
71Id. at 1316 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C)).
72Id. at 1317 (quoting Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 stat. 769).
73Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (1997).
74966 F.Supp 1374, n.3.
15the issue of whether the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate tobacco, and thus the question before the Middle
District Court was whether the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction was a “permissible construction”75 of the
FDCA. In contrast to the majority in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Middle District Court found that
the “legislative history’s silence regarding tobacco products does not indicate that Congress clearly intended
to exempt such products from the Act.”76
The Middle District Court also considered relevant legislative history that demonstrated that the FDA had
once maintained that it did not have jurisdiction over tobacco products, but did not believed this foreclosed
subsequent agency assertion of jurisdiction.77 “FDA oﬃcials testiﬁed before congressional committees on
numerous occasions that the agency lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.... In addition to ex-
pressing its view to Congress that it lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, FDA defended that
position in court.”78 Nevertheless, although the legislative history demonstrated that FDA had maintained
that it lacked jurisdiction over tobacco products, the Middle District Court found that Congress never ac-
quiesced to the FDA’s position. Speciﬁcally, the Middle District Court did not ﬁnd this legislative history
convincing because it did not meet the extraordinary circumstances test required for a court to rely on un-
enacted bills and statements by members of Congress relevant to a determination of congressional intent.79
Finally, the Middle District Court found that, under Chevron, the FDA could adapt its position to new
evidence about tobacco. “FDA contends that it has not altered its interpretation of the FDCA but rather
has applied its longstanding interpretation to new evidence.... [T]he court ﬁnds FDA’s contention reason-
able.”80 As Termini notes, “Past agency policy regarding tobacco should not be held to dictate all future
regulatory schemes. New ﬁndings show, unlike past agency information, that smoking aﬀects the structure
75Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, at 842).
76Id. at 1381.
77See ASH v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
78966 F.Supp 1374, at 1382-3.
79See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-02; United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 474
U.S. 121, 137 (1985).
80966 F.Supp 1374, at 1384.
16and function of the body.”81 Moreover, “the Fourth Circuit ignored, and the United States Supreme Court
did not reach, the issue of newly acquired evidence regarding the FDA’s jurisdiction over tobacco and the
Agency’s regulatory premise.”82
Putting aside arguments for FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products as an indicator of FDA jurisdiction
over NLD’s, the FDA has historically had, albeit small, regulatory jurisdiction over narcotics. The FDA was
given responsibility in the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965.83 The Drug Abuse Control Amend-
ments amended the FDCA to allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “exempt any depressant
or stimulant drug from the application or all or part of this section when he ﬁnds that regulation of its
manufacture, compounding, processing, possession, and disposition... is not necessary for the protection of
the public health.”84 The Act also gave the power to FDA oﬃcers “to conduct examinations, investigations,
or inspections under this act, relating to depressant or stimulant drugs... when so authorized by the Secre-
tary.”85 Further, even after the repeal of earlier statutes and enacted the Controlled Substances Act, the
FDA may still approve “an NDA for any controlled substance that has a legitimate medical use.”86
Applying Arguments to FDA Model Regulation of NLD’s
Based on the Court’s holding in FDA v. Brown & Williamson that the lacks jurisdiction over tobacco prod-
ucts, the FDA probably has no jurisdiction over NLD’s without an amendment to the FDCA. Presumably,
however, in this drug legalization regime, the FDA would be the chosen regulator of NLD’s and the FDCA
would be thus amended to include regulation of NLD’s. Nevertheless, the arguments rejected by the Court
81Termini, supra note 5, at 85-6.
82Termini, supra note 5, at 87.
83DRUG ABUSE CONTROL AMENDMENTS OF 1965, July 15, 1965, 89 P.L. 74; 79 Stat. 226. “To protect the public
health and safety by amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic At to establish special controls for depressant stimulant
drugs and counterfeit drugs, and for other purposes.....
“Sec. 2. The Congress hereby ﬁnds and declares that there is a widespread illicit traﬃc in depressant stimulant drugs moving
in or other wise aﬀecting interstate commerce; that use of such drugs, when not under the supervision of a licensed practitioner,
often endangers safety on the highways....”
84Id., § 511(f)(11)(1965).
85Id. at § 8(a)(1965).
86Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 536.
17in FDA v. Brown & Williamson remain compelling arguments that could be relevant to the FDA if, in
a drug legalization regime, it were given such a radical regulatory charge. For instance, even if Congress
amended the FDCA to grant FDA clear statutory regulatory jurisdiction over cigarettes, the FDA’s jurisdic-
tion could be challenged by NLD-manufacturing companies unhappy with FDA regulatory rulemaking and
enforcement.
In conclusion, while the FDA would appear not to have jurisdiction over cigarettes, nor NLD’s, without an
amendment to the FDCA, there is a basis in the FDCA for NLD regulation. Further, it could be argued
that regardless of the holding in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, and the FDA’s traditional refusal to assert
jurisdiction over cigarettes, would become irrelevant in a drug legalization regime because narcotics were not
legalized at the time Congress enacted the FDCA, nor its amendments. Finally, a legal realist might ﬁnd
the Court’s holding in FDA v. Brown & Williamson was a reaction to FDA Commissioner David Kessler’s
maverick advocacy of several radical administrative changes; however, under this legal realist analysis, if the
FDA Commissioner were merely attempting to regulate the legalization of drugs in the future, the Court
might look more favorably at the salient arguments accepted by the Middle District Court in Coyne and the
dissent in FDA v. Brown & Williamson.
Part II: A Model Plan for Regulation of Illegal Drugs by the FDA87 The FDA Pre-Market Approval
87The regulation of NLD’s by the FDA and application of the current FDCA to NLD’s raises other fascinating FDCA
regulatory issues quickly addressed, here, but worth further examination:
1(a). Misbranding [§ 352(a)-(b)(a)]: A recreational drug would likely be marketed with few medicinal claims. However
marijuana manufacturers could make unsupported medical claims. The FDA could prosecute unsupported medical claims by
drug manufacturers under § 352(a)-(b)(2001). Most likely, the marketing of NLD’s would follow the current cigarette model—
that is, oﬀering no medicinal claims. In fact, drug manufacturers might present Surgeon General’s Warnings—e.g., “cancer,
addiction, driving impairment”, etc.—on NLD packages.. See 21 U.S.C. § 352; Research Laboratories, Inc. v. United States,
167 F.2d 410 (1948)(aﬃrming orders to destroy seized, misbranded product and holding that keeping the product oﬀ the market
served the public good).
1(b). Habit forming substances [352(d)]. Under § 352(d), marijuana manufacturers would have to place habit forming
warnings on marijuana packages (“Warning – May be Habit forming.”). Section 352(d) should possibly be amended to require
a stronger warning for NLD’s—e.g., “Warning – This drug is highly addictive.” See 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(d)(2001).
2. Directions For Use (352(f)(1)). The FDA would have to regulate proper directions for use. Some drugs might be more
18Process Applied to Newly Legalized Drugs88
Presuming that the FDA has, or is given, jurisdiction to regulate NLD’s, how would it regulate marijuana?
How would marijuana be introduced onto the market? Given the FDA’s limited resources, what priorities
would set in regulating the marketing of marijuana in a legalized drug regime (and by extension an array
of once-illegal narcotics)? Given that, historically, the mission of the FDA has been to ensure that “human
and animal drugs are safe and eﬀective,” how can the FDA approve of drugs that are, highly addictive at
best, and physically dangerous at worst? Presumably, the FDA will follow its normal agency course, issuing
“regulations to particularize speciﬁc requirements of the FD&C Act”89 since “[m]ost illicitly manufactured
or illicitly reﬁned drug is contaminated or adulterated.”90
Introducing NLD’s into the Market: New Drug Application
safely ingested by one means as opposed another. While directions for use usually applies to medically indicated drugs, the
FDA could apply directions for use to NLD’s. FDA enforcement of proper directions for use could avoid more dangerous uses
of NLD’s. For instance, “it appears that compulsive cocaine use may develop even more rapidly if the substance is smoked
rather than snorted.” to avoid an Alberty Food Products Co. v. United States, 185 F. 2d 321 (appellant had to rely on outside
sources for information about drug use). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(f)(1)(2001).
3. Intended Use. Here the intended use would be recreation unless the FDA approved marijuana for treating AIDS wasting
symptoms and side-eﬀects of chemotherapy. According to 21 C.F.R. § 201.5, intended use “means directions under which the
layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended.” Intended use may give rise to “adequate directions
for use claims.” See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5. See also United States v. Article of Drug... Designated B-Complex Cholinos Capsules,
362 F.2d 923, 925 (“Whether labeling contains ‘adequate directions for use’ of an article necessarily depends upon what it is
intended to be used for.”). This issue may be less relevant with marijuana, which is smoked, than with other drugs, such as
cocaine or heroin, which can be administered in many ways. For example, there are several methods of administrating cocaine.
“The major routes of administration of cocaine are sniﬃng or snorting, injecting, and smoking (including free-base and crack
cocaine). Snorting is the process of inhaling cocaine powder through the nose where it is absorbed into the bloodstream through
the nasal tissues. Injecting is the act of using a needle to release the drug directly into the bloodstream. Smoking involves
inhaling cocaine vapor or smoke into the lungs where absorption into the bloodstream is as rapid as by injection.” Infofax: Crack
and Cocaine, 13546, <http://www.drugabuse.gov/Infofax/cocaine.html> National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes
of Health, visited March 19, 2002.
88The new drug application process raises an interesting question about the possibility of “me-too” generic marijuana. This
issue is addressed in Hoﬀmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890 (D.D.C. 1975).
89Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 1237.
90See B¨ ollinger, supra note 2, at 123.
19Companies intending to sell marijuana to the public in the legalized drug regime would most
likely have to apply for a New Drug Application (NDA) under § 321(p)(1) of the FDCA.
Also, Marijuana has deleterious eﬀects on users’ mind and body:
Someone who smokes marijuana regularly may have many of the same
respiratory problems as tobacco smokers. These individuals may have daily
cough and phlegm, symptoms of chronic bronchitis, and more frequent chest
colds. Continuing to smoke marijuana can lead to abnormal functioning of
lung tissue injured or destroyed by marijuana smoke.
Regardless of the THC content, the amount of tar inhaled by marijuana
smokers and the level of carbon monoxide absorbed are three to ﬁve times
greater than among tobacco smokers. This may be due to the marijuana
users’ inhaling more deeply and holding the smoke in the lungs and because
marijuana smoke is unﬁltered.
Although marijuana manufacturers would most likely have to make NDA applications to market recreational
and medical marijuana, the current FDCA would may have little eﬀect on the ultimate safety of drugs on
users. In the least, section 321(p)(1) could be used to regulate the claims of marijuana manufacturers
marketing marijuana as a medicine. Under current the current FDA statute, a marijuana company would
have to submit data to the FDA and there is a determination that “there is a lack of substantial evidence
that the drug will have the eﬀect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof...”.91 Conversely, this provision would probably
have little eﬀect on companies who advertised marijuana for recreational purposes—e.g, as promoting a sense
of well-being because it can be scientiﬁcally proven that marijuana promotes a sense of well-being in users.92
Nevertheless, the NDA process could curb unreasonable claims of marijuana manufacturers and also ensure
drug purity.
Yet, introduction of marijuana would create several paradoxical agency problems for the FDA. The reality
9121 U.S.C.A. § 321(p)(1) (2001).
92Infofax: Marijuana, 13551, <http://www.drugabuse.gov/Infofax/marijuana.html> National Institute on Drug Abuse, Na-
tional Institutes of Health, visited February 20, 2002.
20of the drug legalization regime—that the FDA must make NLD’s available to the public in to avoid the costs
of drug prohibition—would undercut the FDA’s ultimate authority to deny all marijuana company’s NDAs
for marijuana products. That is, by virtue of the legalized drug regime, the FDA must accept a new drug
application from at least one marijuana company, or marijuana would once again only be available on the
black market. On the other hand, even a circumscribed new drug policy would permit FDA involvement in
the manufacture of marijuana and prevent weakening of the agency’s ability to determine new drug status
generally.93
Ironically, under current NDA provisions, marijuana companies might not be able market marijuana to
AIDS and cancer patients but the same companies could possibly market marijuana as a recreational drug.
First, in legalized drug regime, the FDA would have to approve marijuana for consumers in some form.
It is not certain whether marijuana companies could market marijuana as a medicine (e.g., to alleviate
pain and discomfort of AIDS wasting syndrome and the eﬀects of chemotherapy.) Although there is some
evidence in their favor, it is unlikely that a marijuana manufacturer marketing smoked marijuana to AIDS
and cancer patients could produce scientiﬁc suﬃcient evidence to get FDA approval. For instance, the
eﬀectiveness of smoked marijuana “has been rejected by the American Medical Association, the National
Multiple Sclerosis Society, the American Glaucoma Society, the American Academy of Ophthalmology and
the American Cancer Society.”94 Further, medical organizations have found smoked marijuana inappropriate
for cancer and AIDS patients, citing its negative eﬀects on immune functions.95 In contrast, a marijuana
company could possibly market marijuana as alleviating stress or promoting a sense of well-being in users.96
93An exception to the FDA’s jurisdiction to determine new drug status could weaken the agency’s ability to regulate other
drugs not involved in the drug legalization regime. As Hutt and Merrill note, “The Supreme Court’s holdings in Bentex and
CIBA that FDA has ‘primary jurisdiction’ to determine new drug states was a major victory for the agency.” Hutt & Merrill,
supra note 48, at 510.
94David G. Evans, High Court Was Right to Nix Medicinal Pot, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), May 22, 2001, at L15.
95Id.
96“Once securely in place, THC kicks oﬀ a series of cellular reactions that ultimately lead to the high that users experience
when they smoke marijuana.” Infofax: Marijuana, 13551, <http://www.drugabuse.gov/Infofax/marijuana.html > National
Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health, visited February 20, 2002.
21Nevertheless, even these claims should be subject to scrutiny. For instance, it is believed that “whether
an individual has positive or negative sensations after smoking marijuana can be inﬂuenced by heredity”97
and other factors. Moreover, the NDA process could require manufacturers to identify dangerous drug
interactions with prescription and over-the-counter drugs and negative side eﬀects such as “problems with
memory and learning; distorted perception; diﬃculty in thinking and problem-solving; loss of coordination;
and increased heart rate, anxiety, and panic attacks.”98 Further, marijuana drug manufacturers would have
to provide “information, both favorable and unfavorable... obtained through investigations,”99 and “contain
information on the process by which the drug is made and how the quality of the drug will be assured.”100
Consequently, although the NDA process could produce paradoxical results, it could also ensure better purity
and safer use for marijuana users.
Safety Standard Prong
The safety standard prong of the NDA process would be valuable for two reasons in this legalized drug regime.
First, it could make it more diﬃcult to for marijuana manufacturers to market marijuana as a traditional
medication—speciﬁcally, in the case of medical marijuana. Secondly, under the risk-beneﬁt analysis employed
by the FDA, recreational marijuana could potentially be approved.
Using the current risk-beneﬁt safety standard, the FDA could approve recreational marijuana. The FDA
approval process is inﬂuenced by public opinion. Presumably, in a drug legalization regime, public opinion
would hold that the beneﬁts of available narcotics (no black market, no drug-related crime; fewer drug-
related societal costs) would outweigh the risks to users (addiction, drug interaction, overdose, etc.). If this
were the case, the overwhelming public opinion in favor of drug legalization might allow the FDA to approve
the marketing of marijuana. According to former FDA Commissioner George Larrick:
97Id.
98Id.
99Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 519.
100Id.
22The decision to approve a drug for marketing, or to withdraw an earlier
approval requires a weighing of the beneﬁt to be expected from use of the
product against the risk inherent in its use....
But over a period of time, the direction of the Government’s decisions will
inevitably be inﬂuenced by public reaction.... The judgments of society are
not necessarily consistent with the scientiﬁc facts. Neither are they always
logical. They can be and sometimes are arbitrary. Even so, neither the
executive nor the legislative branches can ignore them. If it should become
the overwhelming public view that society should drastically limit the risk
no matter how much good a drug can do, then we would be forced to remove
from the market many drugs whose good far outweighs their harm.101
Larrick’s statement suggests that the FDA could approve marijuana. Pointedly, Larrick’s example (where
society’s view is to limit the risk of an otherwise beneﬁcial drug) is the very opposite of what would be
the public opinion supporting the legalization of drugs—e.g., avoiding the societal costs of drug prohibition.
Further, Larrick notes that public opinion is “sometimes arbitrary” and may not necessarily always be a
good inﬂuence on the FDA approval process. Nevertheless, to the extent that public opinion can inﬂuence
the FDA to approve a drug, public opinion could be a powerful factor in the risk-beneﬁt analysis, allowing
the FDA to approve the use of marijuana.
Eﬀectiveness Prong
Like the safety standard, the eﬀectiveness standard could prevent inaccurate marketing of marijuana as
a traditional medicine where it is proven ineﬀective. Given that, according to some research, “marijuana
has shown particular eﬀectiveness in treating the AIDS wasting syndrome and the nausea and vomiting
associated with chemotherapy,” private drug companies may attempt to market medicinal marijuana. 102
Nevertheless, claims of the eﬀectiveness of medical marijuana has been contested.103 The NDA process could
be very valuable in determining the ultimate eﬀectiveness of medicinal marijuana because
Advantages of Approving Marijuana through Grandfather Clause
The FDA might also consider the possibility of using the § 321(p)(1) grandfather clause to avoid undercutting
102Neusch, supra note 31, at 214.
103David G. Evans, High Court Was Right to Nix Medicinal Pot, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), May 22, 2001, at L15.
23its primary jurisdiction104 to determine new drug status.105 Under § 321(p)(1):
Any drug.... not generally recognized, among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc
training and experience to evaluate the safety and eﬀectiveness of drugs
as safe and eﬀective for use under the conditions prescribed... except that
such a drug not so recognized shall not be deemed to be a “new drug” if at
any time prior to the enactment of this chapter it was subject to the Pure
Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906.
It is conceivable that marijuana was recognized by the Pure Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906. According
to Judge Gray, besides a few state and city ordinances, “no laws addressed any currently illicit substance”
until the 1906 passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act.106 And, it was not until 1914 when the Harrison
Act and Webb v. United States (1919), which held that it was illegal for doctors to dispense prescription
drugs to alleviate the symptoms of narcotics withdrawal, made legal use of narcotics illegal. Eight years
passed between the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act and the Harrison Act, thirteen years between
the Pure Food and Drugs Act and the Webb decision. Assuming that the Pure Food Drugs Act did not
create an outright ban of narcotics, marijuana use could be “grandfathered” by the FDA under § 321(p)(1).
Another reason for approving marijuana under the grandfather clause is that the NDA process, like the
general principles of the FDA itself, are purity and safety of drugs. One of the strongest arguments against
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products in Brown & Williamson was that tobacco products are inherently
unsafe. And, the purpose of the FDA is to ensure the purity and safety of drugs. The majority noted in
Brown & Williamson, “In view of the FDA’s conclusions regarding health eﬀects of tobacco use, the agency
would have no basis for ﬁnding any such reasonable assurance of safety. Thus, once the FDA fulﬁlled its
statutory obligation to classify tobacco products, it could not allow them to be marketed.”107 Implicit in
the Court’s reasoning is that the FDA’s mission (ensuring purity and safety of drugs) is not commensurate
104Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 510.
105See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 498.
106Gray, supra note 7, at 21.
107120 S.Ct. 1291, at 1303.
24with approving recreational drugs like cigarettes, or marijuana, that are necessarily unhealthy.
On the other hand, use of the grandfather clause to approve marijuana may equally weaken the credibility
of the FDA approval process, and by extension the credibility of the FDA. According to U.S. v. Allan Drug
Corp., “The exception or the Grandfather Clause was perpetuated verbatim by [by the 1962 Amendments]
so that a drug not generally recognized as safe or eﬀective on the date of the Amendment would not be
deemed to be a new drug on that date if its labeling contained the same representations concerning the
conditions of its use.”108
108See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 498.
25Conclusion
Predictions: Ability of the FDA to Accommodate Challenge of Regulating NLD’s
If agency history is an indicator, the FDA could surmount the administrative challenge of regulating NLD’s.
The FDA has accommodated governmental growth, budgetary cutbacks, and remains insulated from some of
the public pressures facing other governmental bodies. The FDA “has grown in size as the federal government
has grown, assuming larger responsibilities as private ordering gave way to regulation in many areas....”109 Of
course, a drug legalization regime would be more complex and more costly than the hypothetical regulation
of medicinal and recreational marijuana marketed by private drug companies. Hopefully, the FDA would
receive additional funding commensurate with the task of regulating NLD’s. If not, the new charge of
regulating once-illegal drugs could amount to a budgetary cutback, given the many responsibilities of the
agency. However, in the past, the FDA has survived budget cutbacks. For instance, the “FDA fared relatively
well in maintaining its budget during the general reductions of the 1980s.”110 And in the case that the FDA
did not receive necessary budget increase to regulate NLD’s, it might, as it has in the past employ innovative
regulation that is “less suspicious and more inventive”111 in ensuring the safety and purity of once illegal
narcotics.
Amendment to the FDCA Necessary to Meet Jurisdictional and Institutional Challenges
The FDA could best regulate NLD’s with a statutory amendment to the FDCA to both ensure jurisdiction
over NLD’s and to maintain the credibility of the agency. In a drug legalization regime, not only should the
Controlled Substances Act be necessarily amended to make narcotics legal to the public, but the Controlled
Substances Act and the FDCA should oﬀer speciﬁc jurisdiction to the FDA to regulate NLD’s. The Fourth
Circuit and Supreme Court rulings against FDA jurisdiction in FDA v. Brown & Williamson “stemmed
109See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 5.
110See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 17.
111See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 20.
26from directly from congressional inaction and prior actions by the FDA negating assertion of jurisdiction.”112
First, the FDA probably does not have jurisdiction over currently-illegal narcotics, and certainly has no
jurisdiction over tobacco products.113 The FDCA has been amended often, and several times to expand the
power of the FDA.114 While, as discussed in Part One, there are indeed arguments favoring FDA jurisdiction
over NLD’s in the current FDCA, such an amendment would avoid unnecessary litigation.
112Termini, supra note 5, at 85.
113See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A § 801 (2001); 120 S.Ct. 1291.
114See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 48, at 13.
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